(…) can be seen as a way of introducing hierarchy and order -or at least a set of coordinating mechanisms -into a chaotic system otherwise marked by proliferating institutions and norms.' 2 Many observers framing the debate in that way castigate the idea of global constitutionalism as a naïve desire to re-create unity and harmony in international law. 3 From that perspective, a holistic international constitution is (erroneously) hailed by its protagonists as a remedy against the threat of fragmentation, as a (vain) attempt to preserve order, stability and values, while in reality pluralism bordering chaos reigns.
Contrary to that stance, this contribution suggests that a constitutional perspective allows for a more adequate description of the international order as it stands, exactly because of the latter's fragmented character. I start with Olivier de Frouville's observation that 'the time may have come when the concept of a constitution should be put at the forefront again, not because there was no constitution before-in fact (…) there has always been a constitution in international law-but because this concept is now more useful than ever in understanding and describing international law as it is today, that is a legal order which has become more complex, fragmented, and difficult to conceptualize with such elementary concepts such as sovereignty and consent.' 4 Beyond that heuristic insight, this paper makes four points: First, the constitutionalisation of international law is a broad and deep phenomenon which historically started before fragmentation (section 2) has been discussed as a problem. Second, fragmentation and constitutionalisation are mutually reinforcing and to some extent even mutually constitutive: 5 On the one hand, constitutionalisation phenomena within international law have exacerbated fragmentation, because they have from the outset on taken place at multiple sites, and have produced only constitutional fragments (section 3). On the other hand, fragmentation in turn has triggered new forms of constitutionalisation in international law; the processes of fragmentation are themselves being 'constitutionalised'. Put differently, constitutionalisation (as a process) and global constitutionalism (as an intellectual framework) is profoundly shaping how law-appliers deal with fragmentation, notably because the current 'second stage'-fragmentation debate which concentrates on principles, procedures, and institutions for coordinating, harmonising, and integrating various international regimes, is explicitly or implicitly guided by genuine constitutionalist considerations (section 4).
Thirdly, the discourses of fragmentation and constitutionalisation are largely motivated by a common root concern, namely the concern about the legitimacy of international law. Both phenomena also share the merit of promoting contestation and politization within the international legal process; they are kindred-spirited. Importantly, constitutionalism is not a reconciliatory strategy responding to fragmentation but a critical discourse (section 5).
My conclusion is that global constitutionalism is a useful analytic lens for understanding how international law evolves and works, as long as it is understood as 'thin' (contending itself with procedures as opposed to substance), and inevitably multi-level (necessarily involving domestic constitutional law). Even if a global constitutionalism of this type stays (partly) outside the picture of international law proper, it will always be reproduced in the fragments of the international legal order (section 6).
The fragmentation of international law

Overview
The term 'fragmentation (of international law)' denotes both a process and its result, namely a (relatively) fragmented state of the law. The diagnosis refers to the dynamic growth of new and specialized sub-fields of international law after 1989, to the rise of new actors beside states (international organizations, NGOs, and business) and to new types of international norms outside the acknowledged sources.
The evolution was triggered by the break-down of the communist bloc in 1989 which brought to an end the stable bi-polar world order. In the wake of the post-cold war 'new world order' (US President GH Bush), a host of multilateral treaties were concluded: The Rio Conventions and numerous hard and soft environmental instruments were adopted in 1992, the membership of the ICSID-Convention and the number of BITs exploded. New organizations and other permanent international bodies were founded, such as the WTO in 1994. New international courts and tribunals were established (esp. the Yugoslavia and other criminal tribunals since 1992, the WTO dispute settlement body (1994), the ICC (Statute of 1998, functional since 2003), the ITLOS (operational since 1996)). Investment arbitration increased dramatically, and the ECtHR was transformed into a permanent Court with direct access for individuals in 1998.
Causes of fragmentation
The causes of fragmetation seem to be both functional and political. First of all, fragmentation is inbuilt in the decentralized structure of international law which results from the absence of a central world legislator. Second, and connected to the former, fragmentation originates in the domestic sphere: Different issue areas are handled by different departments of government which negotiate different treaties, and different administrative authorities then apply them. Third, fragmentation is a response to globalization. Global problems (ranging from climate deterioration over migration and terrorism to the financial crisis) have triggered a demand for more international, and also more special regulation. 17 From the perspective of global constitutionalism, the political causes may be more interesting. States negotiating treaties normally have different views about policy priorities which translate into relationships between different regimes, for example trade agreements and treaties on cultural or biological diversity. When the states are unable to reach a political solution through treaty design, they leave texts deliberately open-ended, for example, the non-economic exceptions in the GATT, TRIPs, or TBT-Agreement. The bucket is thus passed to the law-appliers, including arbitrators, to possibly 'integrate' the regimes, at the occasion of a concrete legal dispute.
Moreover, realist analyses have depicted fragmentation as the result of a deliberate agenda of powerful states. 18 Benvenisti and Downs have argued that fragmentation serves the latters' interests because it limits the bargaining power of weaker states (which cannot group up within one forum but are isolated in a multitude of settings) and because only those states with a greater 'agenda-setting power' 19 can easily create alternative regimes which suit their interests better. The authors identify four fragmentation strategies: Avoiding broad regulatory regimes, one-time negotiations (no mechanisms to update agreements), avoiding the creation of authoritative institutions (courts, administrations). The fourth strategy is 'regime shifting', that is creating a new regime as soon as the original regime becomes to responsive to the interests of weaker states (the latter are protected by rules which constrain the actors and through the principle of legal equality). 20 While it is not clear whether Benvenisti and Downs have -beyond the anecdotical examples given -revealed a behavioural pattern that is strategically motivated and in fact has hegemonic effects, 21 their 17 See also below text with note 31. 18 E Benvenisti and G W Downs 'The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law ' (2007) 60 Stanford Law Review 595-631. 19 Ibid., at 615. 20 Ibid., 599, in detail at 610-619. 21 Critically M Zürn and B Faude 'On Fragmentation, Differentiation and Coordination', (2013) 13 Global Environmental Politics 119-130 at 125-26. analysis has the merit of politicizing the facially technical fragmentation debate. It draws attention to the loss of overall legitimacy connected to fragmentation -which is exactly the focus of the constitutionalization debate, too.
Types of fragmentation
Taxonomies of fragmentation differ. For example, we might distinguish 'functional' fragmentation from regional ('geographic'/'territorial') fragmentation. 22 Two relevant facets seem to be the institutional fragmentation (different treaties, organisations, bodies, courts) and the ideational fragmentation (different objectives and values). These two facets flow into each other, assuming that each institution (COP, dispute settlement body, etc.) tends to favour the values and objective of its own regime, be it only because the law-makers and law-appliers know that regime better than competing ones (the expertise-based bias).
The ILC-works on the law of international (state) responsibility, mostly in the 1970s and '80s, ventilated the idea of regimes which prescribe and control all reactions to breaches of their norms. Any recourse to the general law of international responsibility, notably to counter-measures, would then be precluded (self-contained régimes). The ICJ applied this concept once and qualified the 'rules of diplomatic law' as a 'self-contained régime'. 23 That term needs to be buried. For reasons of structural coherence and policy results, there are and should be no sealed-off regimes. 24 General international law always constitutes the normative environment, and is applicable to fill gaps or when the rules of the regime themselves can not fulfill the regime's stated objectives. The ILC study of 2006 therefore suggested the label 'special treaty-regimes' instead. 25 More importantly, we can distinguish between fragmentation in law-making and fragmentation in law-application. As just mentioned, the political process of developing international (treaty) law results in fragmented law, either for lack of political agreement on inter-regime relations, or due to the hegemonic interest of powerful law-making states (see above sec. 2.2.). But even if fragmentation were avoided in law-making, the law could be (further) fragmented by the autonomous law-appliers. promoting labourers' welfare), but rather merely tensions arising from the prioritization of different objectives. Actual conflicts normally only arise in the concrete case at hand, i.e. in law-application and dispute-resolution.
Typical issue areas among which tension may arise are free trade in tension with environmental and species protection, 26 or with human rights/ labour rights. 27 These tensions can -somewhat simplistically -be framed as conflicts between 'private' interests (property, contract) and the (global) public interest, even if -at least in the theory and experience of free market economy/capitalism -the protection of those private rights has trickle down benefits for (some) other market participants and society at large.
As far as the protection of property and other rights or interests of foreign investors are concerned, the necessity that the law-applier reconcile private rights and public interests now arises in international law just as it is familiar from domestic law. The identification of public purposes which would allow, e.g., an expropriation, normally falls within the domaine réservé of the host state. Norms of other specific branches of international law such as environmental law, 28 cultural heritage law, 29 rights law, 30 might enter the balance here -as in fact cautiously accepted in arbitration practice. It is doubtful whether the fragmentation, i.e. the dispersal of the relevant rules among the different branches of international law, changes anything in the outcomes of such balancing decisions which would also have to be made by lawappliers if all relevant norms were united in one single treaty.
The assets of fragmentation
Fragmentation may be beneficial. First of all, fragmentation is an adequate reaction to modernity and modern complexity of life. It is, to speak with Michael Zürn, 'not the dissolution or decomposition of a preexisting world polity or order, but rather an indicator for the emergence of a differentiated world polity or order.' 31 Complexity requires differenciated norms and specalised law-appliers who divide labour. The idea of the priority of the lex specialis is exactly motivated by this consideration: Special norms are normally better tailored for the regulation of an issue, and special institutions are normally better equipped to apply them. 32 This proximity (in terms of substance and in terms of regional culture) may enhance acceptance and thus increase compliance rates.
A related stance is that some competitive pressure may be beneficial: Competition between regimes, organisations, courts, and any other institutions may promote productive exploration and experimentation, enhances creativity, allows for correcting mistakes, reduces the risk of failure of one single institution, and thus overall leads to improved performance, notably to better law-making andapplication. 33 30 The privatization of infrastructure (service public), notably water services, partly required by the World Bank from developing states, has often attracted foreign investors. Measures taken by host states such as repudation of lease contracts, failure to improve facilities, negative propaganda, or lowering of water prices have been attacked by investors before arbitral tribunals with the argument that the host state violated the investment contracts and international investment law. It has been suggested that 'human rights and sustainable development issues are factors that condition the nature and extent of the investor's responsibilities, and the balance of rights and obligations as between the investor and the host State.' This would mean that 'foreign corporations engaged in projects intimately related to human rights and the capacity to achieve sustainable development (…), have the highest level of responsibility to meet their duties and obligations as foreign investors, before seeking the protection of international law. This is precisely because such investments necessarily carry with them very serious risks to the population at large. ' Another aspect is protection against concentrations of power. While it has been asserted that in practice the existence of multiple institutions tends to favour big states which possess sufficient manpower and expertise to staff those numerous institutions, any institutional dispersal in the first place helps to prevent abuse because it constitutes a separation of powers with the possibility of checks and balances. Furthermore, accountability is increased by the existence of more and 'new opportunities for dissatisfied parties to challenge existing rules'. 34 Finally, a higher number of international courts and tribunals leads to a better enforcement of international law, and this conforms to the ideal of a rule of law.
At first sight, the creation of antagonist treaties allows different political preferences (of the polical opposition within states, but also of transnational interest groups) to express themselves on the international level. 35 In fact, some treaties have been, in political terms, explicitly designed as 'counter-conventions' to others. For example, the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions of 2005 seeks to mitigate the WTO-regime, after the attempt of some negotiating states such as Canda and France to insert into the GATS and GATT an exception culturelle had failed. 36 In the same sense, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety of 2000 is a counter convention to WTO. 37 It can be said that the resulting 'regime conflicts' are praiseworthy because they manifest pluralism -but it remains to be discussed what this means in normative terms (see below sec. 3.4.).
To conclude, fragmentation (and the pluralism going with it) may enhance both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of international law and its application − but only when it is channeled by constitutional principles and procedures (see below sec.4).
Fragmentation as a problem
The institutional, procedural, and substantive diversification called 'fragmentation' indeed bears risks. First of all, fragmentation may create conflicts and incompatibilities of legal obligations. A conflict in a narrow sense is present when mutually incompatible obligations arise from diverging rules. These are often treaty conflicts, but also conflicts with or among new types of norms such as codes of conducts, memoranda, and so on. Fragmentation also engenders losses of legal certainty which is in turn an element of the (global) rule of law. The multiplicity of institutions (especially of courts and tribunals), and the diverging and possibly conflicting legal norms that are available to those bodies reduce the predictability and reliability of law application. The resulting insecurity is both procedural (e.g. relating to jurisdiction and admissibility of complaints) and substantive. Law-users may exploit the fragmentation (and the diverse institutional outlooks going with it) through forum shopping and regime shifting, based on the strategic consideration which forum and regime will respond best to their claims based on their parochial interest. A legal order is present only when norms refer to each other (ordered norms). But legal order means not only ordered law but also order through law. These two dimensions are mutually reinforcing: The normative pull of international law is fortified by its stringency and consistency. 42 Understanding this interrelationship means understanding why consistency is particularly important for international law (more than for domestic law): because its normative power is more precarious.
To conclude, what is at stake in fragmentation is unity, harmony, cohesion, order, and -concomitantly − the quality of international law as a truly normative order. Worries about this fact have been disparaged as a 'postmodern anxiety' 43 in a world which has lost stable values. But is it not a justified concern is that international law could 'no longer be a singular endeavor, (…) but merely an empty rhetorical device that loosely describes the ambit of the various discourses in question'? 44 Without some glue holding together the 'special regimes' and 'institutional components', writes Georges Abi-Saab, 'the special regime becomes a legal order unto itself − a kind of legal Frankenstein' that 'no longer partakes in the same basis of legitimacy and formal standards of pertinence.' 45 So ultimately, at the bottom of the fragmentation debate lies, just like in the constitutionalization debate, a concern for a loss of legitimacy of international law, a loss which will ultimately threaten that law's very existence.
Fragmented constitutionalization
Overview
The debate on constitutionalization suffers from the great variety of meanings assigned to the key terms. I will here use constitutionalization as the label for the evolution from an international order based on some organizing principles such as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and consensualism to an international legal order which acknowledges and has creatively appropriated and -importantlymodified principles, institutions, and procedures of constitutionalism.
Global constitutionalism is an intellectual movement which both reconstructs some features and functions of international law (in the interplay with domestic law) as 'constitutional' and even 'constitutionalist' (positive analysis), and also seeks to provide arguments for their further development in a specific direction (normative analysis). The function of constitutional law normally is to found, to organize, to integrate and to stabilize a political community, to contain political power, to provide normative guidance, and to regulate the governance activities of law-making, lawapplication, and law-enforcement. The desired constitutionalist elements are notably the rule of law, containment of political and possibly economic power through checks and balances, fundamental rights protection, accountability, democracy (or proxies such as participation, inclusion, deliberation, and transparency), and solidarity. 46 Importantly, the constitutionalization of international law is accompanied and coconstituted by the internationalization (or globalization) of state constitutions consisting in the (re-)importation of international precepts (such as human rights standards) into national constitutional texts and case-law, which simultaneously brings about a 'horizontal' convergence of national constitutional law. 47 The scattered legal texts and the case-law together might form a body of global 48 constitutional law, a specific subset of law, drawing both on international law and on domestic law, which has a particular normative 'constitutional' status, and the above-mentioned specific 'constitutional' functions. This body is not united in one single document called world constitution. Global constitutional law consists of fundamental norms which serve a constitutional function for the international legal system at large, or for specific international organizations or regimes, and norms which have taken over or reinforce constitutional functions of domestic law. 49 Historically speaking, the constitutionalization debate engages false friends. Although the concept of a 'constitution of the international legal community' had been spelled out in the inter-war period by the Austrian Alfred Verdross, 50 that conceptualisation is not at the roots of the contemporary debate. 51 In the 1990s, eminent German authors diagnosed an erosion of the consent principle (and hence an erosion of state sovereignty) and a rise of the 'international community'; 52 these writings are (maybe against the authors' intentions) in hindsight considered as initiators of the contemporary debate. In 2000, the German society of international law chose 'constitutionalization of international law' as one topic of its annual meeeting. 53 In parallel, the controversies about the qualification of founding documents of international organisations as 'constitutions', gained momentum in the 1990s. These debates referred to the United Nations, the European Union, and the WTO. But the structural features of those regimes which are pinpointed as being 'constitutional' actually differ dramatically from organization to organization, and accordingly the meaning of 'constitutionalization' of the respective regimes differs widely as well (see in detail below sec. 3.2.).
Some variants of constitutionalism beyond the state are extremely diluted, when constitutionalism is considered not as as a matter of positive norms and 'doctrine', but (only) as a discourse and a vocabulary with a symbolic value, as a constitutionalist 'imagination'. 54 Other strands of the debate relate less to international law proper but more to the constitutional law of states, constitutional comparison, borrowing, and migration. Two journals, the 'Journal of International Constitutional Law' (I Con, founded in 2002) and the 'Journal of Global Constitutionalism' (founded in 2011) are forums for this strand. To the extent that constitutionalization covers both international law and domestic law, and is to that extent inevitably a multi-level phenomenon 55 in which the various levels of law and governance may also compensate for each others' deficiencies ('compensatory constitutionalism' 56 or 'supplementary constitutionalism' 57 ), these discourses form part of the broader stream of constitutionalization, too.
The constitutionalization debate has been initiated in contintenal Europe. 58 The early debate was strong among German public lawyers due to their obsession with the state and initial doubts about severing the concept of the constitution from the state. 59 The discussion has meanwhile been picked up in the UK, 60 in the United States, 61 and in Asia. 62 The ideational background of the proponents of global constitutionalism may be a more or less openly catholic (neo-)jus-naturalism, 63 cosmopolitanism, 64 republicanism, 65 general systems theory, 66 discourse theory, 67 functionalism 68 and constitutional economics, 69 social constructivism, 70 social contract theory, 71 critical legal studies, 72 or agnostic. The co-existence of highly divergent sources of inspiration on the one hand creates the danger of empty talk that is only seemingly a real discourse on an agreed topic. On the other hand, the pluralism of outlooks underlying the debate might be more positively assessed as demonstrating that global constitutionalism does not need a particular ideational foundation, but can build on an overlapping consensus.
Fragmentation through constitutionalization of international organizations
Ironically, the topos of constitutionalization appeared in the law of international organizations whose founding documents have long been understood to be both The author propagates an 'organic constitutionalism' as a 'negative universal' based on Ernesto Laclau and Jacques Derrida (esp. at 158-165).
treaties and constitutions 73 − and thus within sectoral, possibly fragmented regimes. The ICJ described the documents' hybridity as follows: 'From a formal standpoint, the constituent instruments of international organizations are multilateral treaties (...). But the constituent instruments of international organizations are also treaties of a particular type', with a ‚character conventional and at the same time institutional '. 74 However, beyond the hybrid quality of the organizations' 'constitutional treaties', 75 the assessment whether some constitutionalization is taking place, in which features it lies, and whether this phenomenon is (or would be) laudable, wildly differs. A related issue is the constitutionalization of special branches of law populated by numerous organizations and treaty regimes, such as international environmental law 76 and of the ECHR as the Constitution of Europe. 77 Here, too, the actual constitutional features of the regimes are contested.
The United Nations
With regard to the United Nations, the Security Council is in the centre of attention. 82 In ECJ, cases C-420/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), ECR 2008 I-06351, paras 281-2, 316, 326, the assertion of a European Union constitutional order was an important discursive building block in the argument that the European courts must fully scrutinize the conformity of regulations which implement the United Nations' targeted sanctions with European fundamental rights, even if the courts' annulation of a regulation on the ground of its unconstitutionality inevitably leads to the EU falling short of compliance with Security Council resolutions.
The European Union
With regard to the EU, the first driver of constitutionalization was the ECJ. Already in 1963, the Court reclaimed the authority to determine in a central fashion the direct effect of EC (later EU) law (van Gend & Loos), 83 which it has since then generously accorded to numerous provisions of European primary and secondary law. In 1964, in Costa v ENEL, 84 the Court emphasized the detachment of the European legal order from general international law and established the supremacy of European law over the law of the member states (including over member states' constitutions). 85 In a somewhat circular way, the Court relied on the enhanced legal status of the individual as a subject of the European legal order, next to the member states, as being both cause and effect of these specific effets of European law.
In the 1980s and 1990s, scholars began to acknowledge these seminal judgments as 'constitutional moments', 86 and hotly discussed the role of the Court as a constitution-maker. In the following, the ECJ frequently used the constitutional vocabulary to protect and expand its judicial powers. 87 The most recent ocurrence is the Court's resistance to the EU's accession to the ECHR. After the creation of a legal basis for such accession in the TEU (Art. 6(2) in the Lisbon version), the ECJ denied the compatibility of the 2013 draft accession agreement with EU law, based on constitutional considerations: 'The fact that the EU has a new kind of legal order, the nature of which is peculiar to the EU, its own constitutional framework and founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional structure and a full set of legal rules to ensure its operation, has consequences as regards the procedure for and conditions of accession to the ECHR.' 88
The accompanying debate related to the qualification of the successively amended founding documents as a constitution (or rather as a hybrid treaty-constitution) and to the possible legal consequences of such qualification. What mattered in practical terms was the relationship between EU-law and the law of the member states and the seat of the authority to define that relationship. One concept to describe the whole was the 'Verbundverfassung' or 'multi-level constitution'. 89 In substance, the probably most important focus of the debate was the 'democratic deficit' of the increasingly powerful and law-generating EU. 90 The entire issue was somewhat muted by the rejection of the 'Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe' of 2004 by the populations of France and the Netherlands. It was exactly the label of constitution and its (in my view erroneous) assocation with statehood which was the main cause of its defeat.
The WTO
The WTO Apellate Body has stressed the 'contractual' (as opposed to any 'constitutional') character of the WTO Agreement. 91 In scholarship, however, 92 first, the judicialization of the dispute settlement mechanisms and the use of 'constitutional' balancing techniques have been regarded as the marker of constitutionalization. 93 A second item is the WTO-Agremeent's function as a constrainer of protectionist measures adopted by members whose parliaments and executives are excessively lobbied by rent-seeking societal groups. 94 Finally, the need for the WTO-regime to integrate non-trade concerns, including the protection of human rights, labour rights, environmental concerns and animal welfare has been discussed under the heading of a constitutionalization of the WTO. 95 Only with regard to the latter focus, the quest for a constitutionalization of the WTO, or for the 'constitutional interpretation' of WTO-law 96 is indeed a reaction to regime fragmentation. In the WTO debate, lucid observers have pinpointed that what is at stake is ultimately the social legitimacy (acceptance) of the regime, and have disagreed whether and which kind of constitutionalization would alleviate or -on the contrary -exacerbate perceptions of illegitimacy. 97 This sectoral constitutionalization (of the UN, the EU, the WTO, the ECHR, etc.) to some extent manifests and reinforces fragmentation. With a view to the constitutionalization of the various regimes, Jan Klabbers has observed that '[f]ighting fragmentation by constitutionalism will, likewise, only result in deeper fragmentation, as the various competing regimes and organizations will be locked firmly in constitutional place -and in battle with each other'. 98
Non-state and private constitutionalization
The multiplication of transnational actors assuming a role both in the making and in the enforcement of international law has contributed to some kind of fragmentation, too. This phenomenon has in turn given rise to different types of constitutionalization, reacting to new law-producers and new forms of law. In the early phase of the 1990s, the focus was on NGOs which were regarded as quasirepresentatives of an emerging civil society. The constitutional role attributed to them is participation (in international conferences and other bodies). Accordingly, 'participation' has emerged as one core constitutional principle of international law. 99 Concomittantly, the question of the legitimacy of those NGOs themselves popped up and triggered the demand for their internal constitutionalization (democratic structures, transparency, accountability, and so on).
Gunther Teubner has highlighted that the contemporary challenge for constitutionalism lies in privatization as much as in globalization. Constitutionalism must therefore move beyond the nation state, but in a double sense: into the transnational sphere and into the private sector. are emerging through 'auto-constitutionalization', with constitutionalization meaning the juridification of reflexive social processes. This is the idea of 'societal constitutionalism', i.e. the acknowledgment that actors of civil society (both nonprofit and business) are endowed with a natural authority to produce non-state law including constitutional law. 100 The current effort, shared by important international organizations (led by the UN and the OECD), to hold business 'responsible' for respecting international human rights (corporate social responsibility, human rights due diligence, self-regulation, labeling, and certification) 101 is a significant continuation of global constitutionalization with regard to economic actors. This type of constitutionalization defies and erodes the public-private split by extending constitutional concepts (and bonds) to the private (economic) sphere.
Another facet of this extended constitutionalism is the relatively recent international organizations' battle against grand corruption, 102 and worldwide rebellions against political regimes predominantly directed against the personal illicit enrichment of their leaders. These actions are motivated by the perception that corruption is one of the most important obstacles to development, and a direct antagonist of the rule of law. 103 Another important debate relates to the need to strengthen the rule-of-law elements in transnational diagonal arbitration through securing the structural and personal independence of decision-makers, improved review, limits on arbitrability, increased options for the state side to institute proceedings, increased attention to obligations of the private party to the proceedings, and the like. Finally, states and intergovernmental actors are pursuing objectives that are (ostensibly) in their (national) public interest on the supra-national plane with help of private actors and through the legal instruments of private law (such as private contract, concessions, and property titles), e.g. 'land-grabbing'. Because of the potentially detrimental effects of these activities for other states or their inhabitants these need to be regulated and contained, too.
All this shows that constitutionalism should no longer be confined to the traditional 'public' sphere, but that it may and must be extended to the business sphere, not blindly, but in a mitigated way, adapted to the specific logics of that sphere of society. 104 Against this background, attempts to re-ify a supra-national public-private split by insisting on 'international public authority' as a key concept to which the constitutional strings should be attached, 105 deserves careful reconsideration.
Interim conclusion: Constitutional fragments in a pluralist legal space
All phenomena scetched out so far in section 3 show that constitutionalization (if we want to speak of it) is itself fragmented. Global constitutionalism relates to multilevel governance (implying nested constitutional orders). It concerns various subfields ('regimes' or issue areas) of the law. There seem to be a special process of constitutionalization of the private sector. Besides, the various members of the global (constitutional) order, not only the nation states, but some international organizations may have their own 'sectoral' constitution (as described for the international organizations above in sec. 3.2.). All this also means that constitutional substance may be dispersed ('vertically') across different levels of the law, 'horizontally' across areas of the law, and across the public -private realms (sec.
3.3.).
This diagnosis precludes any conceptualization of constitutionalization as the emergence of a 'super-constitution' which would lie both 'above' domestic state constitutions and which would completely embrace all separate international regimes, too. Rather, we see constitutional fragments, firstly in different issue-areas of law and governance, secondly, in different geographic regions, and thirdly on different 'levels' of governance. These fragments interact which each other, sometimes converging but also conflicting. 106 Besides, the intellectual framework of constitutionalism is fragmented, too. 107 So while it is true that the very idea of 'fragmented' (i.e. multiple and multi-level) constitutionalism implicitly gives up the claim to totality, this idea better describes real-life phenoma (even within states) than the more traditional holistic notion of constitution.
These three points are relevant for global constitutionalism as well. Compared to domestic constitutionalism in its current actually existing form, the existence, growth, and sometimes regression of multiple constitutions and of fragmented constitutional law can also be reasonably deemed to constitute processes of constitutionalisation, and to manifest constitutionalism. 108 What is more, I submit that the above-mentioned multiple and fragmented processes of constitutionalization do not always and inevitably cancel each other out but are apt to co-exist, to reinforce each other and even to compensate mutually each others' deficiencies. 109 From that perspective, it becomes less important on which normative 'level' some basic constitutional principles, for example fundamental rights norms, are formally codified.
Notably James Tully's pluralist recasting is relevant for global constitutionalism. Taking into account the extreme diversity of societies worldwide, global constitutionalism is, if at all, conceivable only as pluralist constitutionalism. 110 I use 'pluralism' as a label for a normative position which, firstly, welcomes the multiplicity, diversity, and overlap of legal (sub-)orders, of rules and principles, of sources of authority, of norm-producing actors and institutions in various sectors, which, secondly, accepts that levels of governance that stand in a non-hierarchical relationship to each other (absence of a meta-norm, overarching Grundnorm, or the like, to resolve the competing claims for validity, authority, supremacy), and which thirdly welcomes the plurality of values and perspectives espoused by the multiple actors. This type of pluralism may go hand in hand with constitutionalism.
Pluralism does not require 'that each good should be pursued by an autonomous regime. It may well turn out that a relatively consolidated form of global constitutionalism, rather than unregulated global legal pluralism, is the best way to ensure a healthy pluralism of human values. Value fragmentation does not dictate institutional fragmentation'. 111
Most importantly, 'pluralism' alone is not sufficient as a guide-line for ordering a society, because it does not say anything about its own limits. Some additional principles, whether democracy, individual freedom, equality, or mutual respect, etc. are needed, otherwise, 'global legal pluralism might end up consecrating a ruthless world governed (…) by "nothing other than the advantage of the stronger" ' lawapplying institution. 112 Therefore, constitutional principles and procedures are needed to constructively deal with pluralism (and with fragmentation), notably to protect the weaker actors in international relations. To these we now turn.
Constitutionalizing Fragmentation
This section describes how the fragmentation of international law is continuously being more or less successfully constitutionalised with help of novel principles, procedures and institutions dealing with discrepancy, collisions, and conflict. I will first turn to the traditional devices of conflict resolution that are geared at binary ('either − or') solutions, leading the application of one norm over a potentially conflicting other norm stemming from a different source or regime. 
Binary and 'horizontal' techniques of conflict-resolution
The first set of traditional juridical principles for resolving conflicts among norms are the priority of the lex specialis (the treaty that deals more specifically with a matter shall prevail), 113 and the priority of the lex posterior (the treaty later in time shall prevail).
In the international legal system, in which norms are produced in a decentralized way, both the speciality-rule and the later-in-time-rule seems less adequate than in a domestic system, 114 for two principal reasons: First, the later rule (the later treaty) may have been created by totally different actors than the earlier one, and therefore its making does not imply a decision to supersede or undo the prior norm (which might still be favoured by its actual creators). A second reason is that it the different treaties pursue different objectives, and therefore it can hardly be said that they relate to the same 'subject matter' -although this would be a pre-condition for applying either the lex specialis or the lex posterior rule. 115 Also, principles developed in the field of conflict of law (private international law) have been relied on for deciding which treaty to apply over another one. 116 Moreover, the choice-of-law-principles could be used for resolving 'diagonal conflicts' between special international law on the one hand, and domestic law of a different field on the other, e.g. conflicts between WTO procurement law and domestic environmental law. 117 The private international law-model is heterarchical in a double sense: Not only are there a plurality of law-appliers (e.g. domestic courts) which do not stand in a hierarchical relationship to each other, but moreover they each apply their own collision rules which do not necessarily coincide.
A similar principle has been developed for dealing with discrepancies between international law and domestic law, namely the principle of the prevalence of any higher domestic standard (enshrined, e.g., in Art. 5(2) CCPR, Art. 53 ECHR, or in Art. 2(1) of the WHO FCTC 118 ). This principle could be applied mutatis mutandis to the relations between different treaty regimes. Its use would result in the application of only one provision and not the other, but this prevalence would not depend on the formal source of the provisions at stake, but on their contents.
All these traditional conflict resolutions maxims lead to an 'either -or'-application of norms, i.e. they constitute a relationship of mutual exclusiveness of treaties. They may be considered as manifestaitons of a global constitutionalism but only it is loosest sense: Gunther Teubner writes that this 'strictly heterarchical conflict resolution', coming in two forms − either internalizing disputes into the decisions of the regimes or externalizing them to 'inter-regime negotiations' − constitutes the only available 'meta-constitutionalism' of the international realm. 119
Hierarchy
The second traditional conflict resolution is hierarchy. In a system of normative hierarchy, the higher norm is applied, and the other not at all; this device is therefore as 'binary' as the ones described in the preceding section. Establishing a normative hierarchy is at first glance the quintessentially constitutional technique, because supremacy is the single feature most often associated with a constitution; constitutional law normally is 'higher law'. For this reason, it had been suggested that ius cogens or other norms equipped with priority (notably the UN Charter and SC resolutions, due to Art. 103 UN Charter) might be properly understood to form the international constitution. 120 However, hierachy has only an extremely limited scope of application in international law, as shall be briefly recalled. Empirical study of different branches of international law shows that a 'trumping' impact of hierarchically superior norms is limited. 121 In practice, notably ius cogens plays a much softer, non-hierarchical role, e.g. as a guideline for the interpretation of other norms. 122 The precedence of the UNCharter over conflicting obligations of the member states is mitigated by the legal presumption of an absence of conflict, 123 by the intrinsic exception of ius cogens to the prevailing effect of the Charter, 124 and by the reluctance to accord precedence to the Charter over contrary customary law (as opposed to countervailing 'agreements' which are mentioned in Art. 103 125 ).
A different type of hierarchy is foreseen by 'more favourable provision'-clauses. Various human rights treaties and also the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety explicit state that if a different treaty in a related matter sets a different standard, the higher standard shall prevail. 126 This type of 'relative' priority is laudable from a constitutionalist perspective because it allows for a race to the top.
An institutional supplement to normative hierarchy would be the estabslishment of a hiarchical judicial system in international law. Most institutional propositions seeking to counteract fragmentation have favoured the ICJ. 127 In fact, the so-called World Court has the broadest subject matter jurisdiction (not limited to a special area of international law), even if it neither has the broadest membership nor the most developed case law (there is low density due to the small quantity of cases). One proposal was to introduce a reference procedure by granting the ICJ jurisdiction to render advisory opinions requested by other international tribunals, possibly through the UN Security Council or the General Assembly. 128 Thereby, the ICJ would acquire a 'quasi-constitutional role in the international order by identifying those elements which ensure the unity and coherence of the international legal system.' 129 Not only the rendering of Advisory Opinions but already the anticipation of them by other courts and tribunals might prompt those to 'consider the issues before them not only from within the mindset of their particular regime, but also from an external frame of reference.' In such 'a model of reflexive engagement', the ICJ could play a more important role in connecting different regulatory regimes. 130 However, this proposal was a political non-starter. 131 To conclude, a clear (substantive, procedural, or institutional) hierarchy which could resolve normative conflicts has not really emerged, and a further future maturation seems unlikely. 132 Hence, a 'hiarchical' type of global constitutionalism, and a hiarchy-based technique for the constitutionalisation of fragmentation seems unavailable. 133
The principle of constitutional tolerance
A number of fairly novel principles and procedures used in treaty prosisions themselves, and by law-appliers may be gathered under the heading of 'constitutional tolerance'. 134 This tolerance may be viewed as a extrapolation of the idea of marge d'appréciation to relations between different international treaty regimes. Constitutional tolerance means to let the 'other' regime's rule stand, and to tolerate the 'other' monitoring body's assessment.
Just as the traditional margin of appreciation, this type of tolerance is apt to accommodate fragmentation and pluralism by granting a leeway, a space in which cultural, political, and regional differences might play. This technique is motivated by constitutional considerations, namely the insight that the 'closer' institutions are better equipped and more legitimated to apply the law (including the norms of a 'foreign' regime) than those which are further away from the substantive matter. The ECtHR expressed this as follows: 'The national authorities have a direct democratic legitimation and are, as the Court has held on many occasions, in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions.' 135 A related principle is mutual recognition, based on the idea of a functional equivalence of the norms originating from different sources. 136 Mutual recognition can be reasonably applied to inter-regime relations. This means that different standards, e.g. of fair trial, in different regimes (e.g. in the UN as opposed to in the EU) should be mutually recognized as long as a minimal threshold is not undercut. But this approach fits only when the norms in question do not point into opposite directions (for example the free importation of animal products versus import restrictions on the basis of animal cruelty concerns), but when they strive towards the same goal but 67-104: especially tribunals outside the UN system can hardly be linked to the ICJ, and even the if procedural rules were changed, the ICJ would be flooded. 132 with different nuances (e.g. protection of property, but in different degrees). For example, the ECtHR stated in Bosphorus that an international organization (in that case the EU) must 'protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides ... By "equivalent" the Court means "comparable".' 137 The idea of mutual acknowledgement of functional equivalence could be extended beyond the protection of fundamental rights to other constitutional standards, such as the standards of democracy and of the rule of law. Of course the question remains where this standard lies and most of all who defines it.
Techniques of rapprochement
In contrast to all techniques mentioned up to now, newer techniques and procedures to deal with potential discrepancies or even conflict of international norms stemming from different regimes all have in common that they seek to bring in line, to reconcile, or 'integrate' different regimes, thereby avoiding the binary choice to apply one provision and not the other. Put differently, these techniques are geared towards the cumulative application of norms arising from different regimes.
Treaty and customary provisions
The clearest manifestation of this new approach is found in the three principles enounced in Article 20 of the UNESCO Convention on Diversity of 2005 whose heading is: 'Relationship to other treaties: mutual supportiveness, complementarity and non-subordination'. 138 These three principles seek to avoid the binary 'eitheror'-approach and instead favour the combined and cumulative application of the UNESCO Convention and other treaties.
'Notwithstanding-clauses' in the style of Art. 2(3) of the Cartagena Protocol 139 may ultimately work in the same direction, namely that of cumulative application and mutual harmonization. 140 Cross-referrals such as Art. 6(2) and 22(3) of the CCPR (mentioning other human rights treaties) have a similar effect. Furthermore, Art. 44 and 46 CCPR and Art. 24 CESCR seek to prevent impairment of the functions of UN organs and bodies dealing with human rights through the entry of the force of the two Human Rights Covenants. Another example is Article 104 NAFTA, which seeks to promote the reconciliation of potentially conflicting obligations arising out the free . 138 See in this sense also Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity, preamble indent 9: 'recognizing that trade and environment agreements should be mutually supportive.' 139 Art. 2(3): 'Nothing in this Protocol shall affect in any way the sovereignty of States over their territorial sea established in accordance with international law, … '. 140 However, these clauses can also, inversly, be understood as establishing exclusivity.
trade agreement on the one hand and environmental and conservation agreements on the other hand, by explicitly prescribing a balancing approach (albeit with a heavy thumb on the scale in favour of trade). 141 Reconciliatory principles that are applicable across the board smooth out tensions and frictions. For example, the principle of sustainable development is intended to reconcile the frictions notably between the international law of development and international environmental law. 142 Or, the antagonist legal concepts of sovereignty/non-intervention on the one hand and human rights/human security on the other hand are synthesized in the soft law concept of responsibility to protect (R2P). However, the application of these reconciliatory principles cannot in itself resolve any concrete normative conflict but can only prevent the total eclipsing of one of the regimes or principles involved. A related phenomenon is the acknowledgment that international human rights matter for basically all issue areas and subfields of international law. This insight continues to motivate both formal revisions of special norms so as to accommodate human rights concerns, and novel interpretations. 143 Such 'mainstreaming' also has a 'de-fragmentation' effect. 144 Dirk Pulkowski has demonstrated that a small number of basic concepts of international law (such as 'sovereignty', the 'right to have human rights', or specific provisions of the VCLT or the UN charter) should be understood as 'constitutive rules' which create the very possibility of meaningful legal discourse. These will engender 'communicative compatibility' rather than legal unity. 145 Again, this is a different, intuitively constitutionalist take for dealing with fragmentation.
An important phenomenon are references in international treaties (or in the case-law; see on 'judicial dialogue' below) to general international law (possibly fundamental and thus to some extent 'constitutional' principles), and cross-references to other objective of attaining economic and social progress and development. 146 In current international law, Art. 1 of the Cartagena Protocol refers to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 which embodies the precautionary approach. The UNCLOS preamble affirms 'that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law' (last indent). MARPOL and MSC regulations on sea pollution and safety of ships are generally accepted 'international rules and standards' in the sense of Art. 211 and 217-220 UNCLOS. 147 A final example are the references to labour provisions stemming from various ILO conventions, so far in nearly 40 bilateral trade law agreements, some of which actually incorporate these standards directly. 148 In the absence of a central institution which would authoritatively interpret such cross-referenced and 'borrowed' clauses, the spectre of divergent and thus 'fragmented' interpretation arises. This leads us to the interpretative devices.
Interpretation maxims
Two principal interpretation maxims are being used by law-applying bodies to avoid conflict in the first place by harmonizing the various international rules rooted in different regimes.
Presumption of non-deviation
The first technique is a presumption of non-deviation. 149 For example, the ECtHR has established a presumption that there is no conflict between a state's obligation to carry out a Security Council resolution and respect for human rights guaranteed by the ECHR: '[T]he Court considers that, in interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation on Member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights. In the event of any ambiguity in the terms of a Security Council Resolution, the Court must therefore choose the interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict of obligations.' 150 Another example is the management of the tension between the law of immunities and the human right of access to a court under Art. 6 ECHR. In the Srebrenica-case, the ECtHR found that the human right had been restricted in a proportionate manner and not violated. This result was not owed to a normative hierarchy, but the ECtHR reached it through the interpretation of the human rights provision 'in harmony' with pre-existing 'generally recognized rules' of international law, based on the presumption that the state parties of the ECHR did not want to depart from their previous obligations under general international law (namely the obligation to grant immunity to the United Nations). 151 (In contrast, the Dutch Supreme court had taken a hierarchy-based approach and had relied on Art. 103 UN Charter to justify an 'absolute' immunity of the United Nations. 152 )
The presumption of conformity faces the same objection that was raised against the lex posterior rule: Without an identity of law-makers, the presumption has no basis in their actual intentions.
Systemic interpretation
The currently most discussed 'de-fragmentation' technique is the systemic interpretation of international norms. 153 For treaty interpretation, Art. 31(3) lit. c) VCLT prescribes that '[t]here shall be taken into account: (…) c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.' International lawapplying bodies have often practised harmonious interpretation, while not necessarily relying on Art. 31(3) lit. c) VCLT. 154 Since the prominent discussion of that 'master-key' to the house of international law 155 in the ILC fragmentation report of 2006, parties to disputes more often rely on that VCLT-provision, and it is now often quoted in decisions. Arguably, Art. 31 VCLT allows and even mandates treatyinterpreters to take into account of all kinds of 'rules of international law', not only other treaty norms but also customary norms 156 and possibly even soft law. 157 Importantly, reliance on such 'outside' norms does not constitute an unlawful extension of the limited jurisdiction of the monitoring bodies, 158 because these norms are not applied 'directly' but only 'indirectly', as interpretative devices for the proper construction of the regime-specific rules. 159 'Systemic integration' is adequate for the application of customary rules as well, for example for the identification of the scope of state immunity under consideration for human rights. 160 The precondition of Art. 31 VCLT and its underlying principle, namely that the rule be 'applicable the relations between the parties', has infamously been construed narrowly by the WTO Biotech panel. That panel noted that the Cartagena Protocol, on which the European Community as a respondent had relied for interpreting the pertinent WTO Agreements, was in fact 'not applicable', because the Protocol had not been ratified by a number of WTO members, including the complaining parties to the dispute (USA, Argentina, and Canada). 161 The Biotech panel's parallelism requirement (finding that a treaty norm can only be taken into account as an interpretative guideline in a WTO-related dispute when all parties to that dispute − or even all parties to the WTO Agreement which must be interpreted − have ratified that other treaty) would render Art. 31(3) VCLT largely meaningless. This approach would make other treaties non-usable for the interpretation of treaties with a broad membership, such as the WTO-Agreement (which moreover has also non-state members which cannot accede to most other international treaties). The narrow reading would in addition have the paradoxical result that the more universal a treaty is, the smaller the chance that it could 'meet' other treaties would be. The Biotech decision has largely been appraised as a political decision to 'keep out' international environmental law from WTO law and as expressing a political preference for free trade. The better and meanwhile prevailing view is that it is not necessary that all states in the organisation/treaty are also parties to the other treaty to make the latter usable, if they are not involved in the dispute. 
Procedures
Judicial dialogue
The most discussed 'procedure' or vessel for promoting the substantive rapprochemet of different regimes as described above is judicial dialogue. This is itself informal but could be encouraged and facilitated through institutional formats. Judicial dialogue basically means courts' mutual attentiveness to each other's caselaw and cross-citations.
Importantly, the 'global community of courts' would need to encompass not only international courts and tribunals but also domestic ones applying international and foreign law in order to bring about a 'global' jurisprudence. 166 It has been claimed that such an 'interjudicial dialogue (…) has the potential to preserve the unity of the 163 van Aaken (note 1) 483-512, at 501-506. 164 See references to the case-law above in notes 28-30. 165 international legal system in face of fragmentation'. 167 Moreover, the dialogue could be conducted by other international bodies, beyond the judiciaries, as well.
It has also been pointed out (albeit more with regard to national courts) that the idea of a 'dialogue' is conceptually flawed because courts do not cite one another for the purpose of communicating (but for quite other reasons), and empirically false because only some very few prestigious courts are cited. 168 Also, it is far from clear whether international courts are prepared to cooperate, or whether the prevailing behaviour is jealous protection of their jurisdiction. 169 Against this skepticism, it must be noted that as a matter of fact, cross-citations by international courts do occur, and probably increasingly. For example, the European Court of Human Rights regularly applies international human rights norms other than the ECHR (the Children's Rights Convention, the Refugee Convention, the CCPR, the CAT), the law on state immunity, IHL, and provisions of 'general' international law (law of treaties and norms on the ICJ procedure). 170 Inversly, the ICTY relied, in its early decision on torture, on the ECtHR-case law. In doing so, the Tribunal acknowledged that the broad concept of torture as used in human rights law might not be adequate in the field of international humanitarian law and for a criminal law definition which must satisfy strict standards of legality. 171 The UNCTAD global principles on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing practices have been invoked in an arbitration involving sovereign debt. 172 The WTO Appellate Body famously stated that the GATT 'is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law.' 173 In the dispute settlement body's practice, ideas and norms from other regimes have in fact been 'imported' into the trade system. 174 Inversely, an 'export' of WTO-norms to other regimes has also been taking place. A recent analysis of the influence of WTO rules and case law on regional and international dispute settlement in international economic law (investment law and non-WTO-trade law) has found that substantive WTO rules (the WTO acquis) has 'overwhelmingly' been used by trade and investment courts/tribunals. 175 The reason for referencing the WTO seem to be both 'functional closeness' of the issue areas, the 'authority' of the WTO in international economic law, and the judges and arbitrators' 'interest in maintaining to normative and inter-regime coherence, which might very well be intrinsic to legal reasoning itself.' 176
Such cross-references and resort to the surrounding 'general' international law have the effect of lining different treaties up with each other and/or to direct them towards respect of shared principles. For example, the principle of national treatment exists both in WTO-law and investment law, and cross-citations have the effect of consolidating its meaning in the sense of a shared content.
In judicial practice, the 'systemic outlook' has been asked for by some judges. 177 The ILC study on fragmentation put it thus: 'that conflicts between specialized regimes may be overcome by law, even as the law may not go much further than require a willingness to listen to others, take their points of view into account and to find a reasoned resolution at the end.' 178
On a more abstract level, what is happening here, and what should be welcomed and encouraged, is the internalization of an outside perspective. Gunther Teubner observes that the differentiation and autonomization of 'systems' (which seems to include the various international treaty regimes) has resulted in a 'network architecture' of transnational regimes. The important analytical and normative point now is that 'each regime needs to combine two contradictory requirements': All regimes spell out their own vision of a global public interest (from their own perspective), while all regimes 'at the same time take account of the whole by transcending their individual perspective.' 'Each regime must create the overarching ordre public transnational from its own perspective', a 'shared horizon of meaning' needs to be constructed, a 'counterfactual assumption of a common normative core'. 179 It seems fair to say that this 'common core' is a kind of constitution. 
Non-judicial 'regime interaction'
A pragmatic approach to curb the negative effects and make most productive use of the potential benefits of fragmentation lies in the practice of the bodies of treaties or organizations to entertain contacts all the while renouncing on laying down guidelines for the resolution of potential conflicts. The only minimal prerequisite for coordination and possibly cooperation seems to be information-exchange − potentially with a view to identify possible common goals (or sub-goals) and shared principles. This phenomenon of institutional contact has been called 'regime interaction'. 180 A number of 'integration rules' 181 183 At the occasion of the signing of the WTO-Agreement, the ministers adopted the 'Decision on Trade and Environment', with which they established a WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), on the basis of the consideration 'that there should not be, nor need be, any policy contradiction between upholding and safeguarding a (…) multilateral trading system on the one hand, and acting for the protection of the environment, and the promotion of sustainable development on the other, Desiring to coordinate the policies in the field of trade and environment, (…)' (15 April 1994). The CTE practices cooperation and information exchange with UNEP and the bodies of the multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). 184 In the field of sustainable development, both the Agenda 21 of 1992 and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) 185 seek to 'encourage interaction and cooperation between the United Nations system and other intergovernmental and non-governmental subregional, regional and global institutions and nongovernmental organisations in the field of environment and development', 186 notably with international financial organisations. Or, to give another example, the FAO and CITES secretariats cooperate with regard to the listing of endangered marine species. 187 An important observation is that this interaction may shape and develop international norms beyond the consent of member states. 188 That law-developing activity therefore requires an additional basis of legitimacy. That basis can be (and is in fact already) created through participation (state parties, stakeholder and experts) and information/reason-giving. 189 While this framework for regime interaction falls short of 'substantive' constitutionalism, it does amount to a procedural constitutionalization, based on procedural principles of inclusion and transparency.
Again, the constitutionalist perspective helps to understand and possibly develop the interaction of regimes not as a managerial problem but as a political issue. However, the quest for respect of at least the mentioned procedural principles has been disparaged as a part of an inevitably hegemonizing strategy employed by the protagonists of one regime (e.g. trade) over another (e.g. species protection) to falsely represent that regimes' objectives as universal, in order to swallow up the competing ones. 190 But this is a one-sided interpretation of the phenomenon. To the contrary, the principles of inclusion and transparency 191 are precisely apt to counteract the dominance of that regime which is in political terms more powerful than the competing one.
These principles, procedures, and institutions described in this section, mostly the principles of constitutional tolerance (subsec. 3) and all techniques of rapprochement (subsec. 4) may appropriately be called 'constitutional' elements of the international legal order, because they seek to create compatibility, not only in a 'negative' sense of preventing legal conflicts, but also in a supportive ('positive') sense for the achievement of the objectives of other treaties.
Politization
A common core concern in both debates (on fragmentation and constitutionalization) is 'politics', 'politization ', 192 or the lack of both. In the context of fragmentation, the lack of an 'international political society' is deplored. ' [T]he various regimes or boxes -European law, trade law, human rights law, environmental law, investment law and so on' pursue what Martti Koskenniemi has called 'managerialism': 'Each regime understood as a purposive association and each institution with the task of realising it. There would be nothing irregular here if that process were controlled by law emanating from something like an international political society determining the jurisdiction of each regime. (…) But there is no global legislative power, no world government under which the WTO could be seen like a global ministry of trade, the Kyoto process as activities of a global environmental ministry or trials of war criminals as something carried out by a global executive arm. (…) Differentiation does not take place under any single political society. Instead it works though a struggle in which every interest is hegemonic, seeking to describe the social world through its own vocabulary so that its own expertise and its own structural bias will become the rule.' 193 From this perspective, 'managerialism' (or: 'executivism'or 'functionalism') seems bad, first, because it does not contemplate the common good of the whole society, and second because decisions and reactions are dictated by a putative 'logic of functions'. The antidote to this would be ‚politization', understood as human activities (communicative and others) seeking to bring about the appropriate (fair; good; legitimate) collective action, institutions, and procedures to regulate the social condition and shared problems on the basis of the perception that choices can and must be made (as opposed to purely 'automatic' and constrained reactions). The most important legal vessel to constitute, channel, and shape such politization would be, I submit, constitutional law.
A related theme is the insistence on the 'political' cause of fragmentation, namely its (again 'hegemonic') exploitation by powerful states (see above sec. 2.2.). Along this line it could be said that the specific lines of fragmentation and unity have 'ideological markings'. Attempts to unify international law would only 'alter the terms by which difference is already expressed and articulated and refragment the terrain along different lines' 194 (and thus merely express different politics). A third variant of the topic of 'politics' emerged in reaction to the initial focus on international courts and their possibly diverging case-law which highlighted the predominance of courts in the international legal process. This diagnosis has been met with the argument that deep normative conflicts arising from the fragmentation of international law could and should be resolved 'politically' (by the global lawmakers which are still mainly the states) and not 'technically' (by international courts and tribunals). 195 The concern that global constitutionalism is too a-political, or pretends to be above politics, exactly mirrors those debates. The constitutionalization discourse (pushed by judges and stylized by academics) condones (according to its critics) an impoverished, legalist, and in that sense a-political conception of constitution.
The call for de-fragmentation and constitutionalization through global 'politics' must be taken seriously. However, it suffers from the ambiguity of the terms 'politics' and 'political'. International law might be said to be 'too political' in the sense that the law often just follows the power-relations between states and stems no strong normativity against politics. From that perspective, a relative 'de-politization' of international relations (through constitutionalization) is beneficial, because the introduction of constitutional principles contributes to the stability of expectations, legal certainty, and to equal treatment of the relevant actors.
Rather, what is properly meant with the lack of 'politics' or of 'politization' both in dealing with fragmentation and in constitutionalization is the lack of an international political process that would be democratic in a much stronger sense than it is now. So the pertinent point is that global governance suffers from democratic deficits and -to some extent correspondingly -from too powerful courts.
Importantly, global constitutionalism unveils precisely those deficits by introducing the constitutional vocabulary. The constitutional paradigm also inspires and eventually facilitates the search for remedies. The remedy against a too 'legalist' and too 'judicial' process of constitutionalization is not to stop that process, but to democratize it. 196 Overall, because constitutional law is a branch of law which is very close to politics, and constitutionalism is also a political, not simply an a-political, project (although it does suggest that there is a sphere 'above' everyday politics), the call for constitutionalization and global constitutionalism can trigger contestation and politics instead of just pre-empting it.
Conclusions
International law is in fact less fragmented than suggested by the overflowing discourse. Empirical findings on the scarcity of conflicts, the prevailing scheme of parallelism and reconciliation of norms from different regimes, and the migration of norms from one regime to another suggest that the problems of fragmentation have been overstated. The diversification of international legal regimes should be welcomed as manifesting a political will of law entrepreneurs and the capacity of international law to address global problems. The emergence of special fields within international law has been a necessary response to the complexity of global society (independently of the possibility of exploitation by states with huge personal resources to negotiate and manage the multiple regimes). Although the lack of a central lawmaker has (inevitably) led to the existence of multiple legal regimes with overlapping but not identical memberships, whose main objectives often stand in tension, the law-appliers (both treaty bodies and court) are careful not to contradict each other. The actual instances of completely irreconcilable norms and case-law or of divergent interpretations of cross-cutting norms by different courts and tribunals have been exceedingly rare. 197 This state of affairs is due to approaches which may be qualified as intuitively constitutionalist. For example, ICJ Judge Greenwood declared in a recent affair: 'International law is not a series of fragmented specialist and self-contained bodies of law, each of which functions in isolation from the others. It is a single unified system of law and each international court can, and should, draw on the jurisprudence of other international courts and tribunals, even though it is not bound necessarily to come to the same conclusions.' 198 We have seen in section 4 that constitutionalism offers procedures and mechanisms to coordinate the working of specialized international legal bodies, to reconcile diverging rationales of the special branches of international law, and that it offers some direction for resolving normative conflicts. However, traditional mechanisms of ordering (such as hierarchy) have been largely replaced by new mechanisms of stabilisation. The quest for constitutionalization is, from that perspective, a call for improving the strategies of coordination of different legal fields and levels of law, for refining the techniques for the avoidance of conflict, and for designing clever mechanisms for resolving the unavoidable ones, in the absence of a clear normative hierarchy. In terms of a constitutional mindset, the relevant actors seem to be willing 'to justify interpretations of regional, global, or relevant domestic law in general rather than parochial terms', 199 and, importantly, to internalize specific outside perspectives. The constitutionalist paradigm furnishes a yardstick for assessing the effectiveness and legitimacy of those mechanisms.
In result, the current state of international law can be appropriately described as an 'ordered pluralism', 200 'unitas multiplex', 201 or 'flexible diversity'. 202 As Mario Prost writes: 'The discourse on fragmentation should be taken with a pinch of salt and with some critical distance.' And when Prost finds that '[o]ur traditional concern for doctrinal purity should not distract us from more meaningful conversations about the substance and direction of the law', 203 he voices a constitutionalist concern.
Fragmentation and constitutionalization: Both phenomena and debates reflect each other. Under the premiss that ' [t] here is no God's Eye Point of view that we can know or usefully imagine; there are only the various points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests and purposes that their descriptions and theories subserve', 204 global governance, its institutions, the legal acts produced by those institutions, and policy results, frictions, and conflicts created by the multiplicity of sites, actors, and acts, may be viewed from different perspectives, as manifesting constitutionalisation or / and fragmentation. For example, the ICTY Tadic decision on jurisdiction is, as already mentioned, a hallmark of 'constitutionalist' jurisprudence, because it underlined that the UN Security Council is subjet to legal limits. 205 At the same time, this decision can be considered a hallmark of fragmentation, because the ICTY here asserted that '[i]n international law, every tribunal is a self-contained system'. 206 We (as scholarly observers) do not have access to 'global governance' as an 'objective reality', it remains unseizable. widespread and deeply felt concern for the legitimacy of the international legal system and its institutions, once the belief in state sovereignty as the necessary and sufficient basic principle had got lost. Importantly, both debates (the fragmentation debate and the constitutionalization debate) have grown out of this concern, but their analyses and normative suggestions depend on the speakers' Vorverständnis and outlook. Some strands of global constitutionalism seek to regain that legitimacy by shifting the Letztbegründung from state sovereignty to human self-determination (rights, welfare, and democracy), 207 by identifying and critizising constitutional deficits of the international order, and finally by reformulating constitutionalist principles and helping to implement them. From the other side, the fragmentation debate, notably in its second phase, has identified legitimacy deficits arising from internal contradictions and norm conflicts. It is submitted here that the coordinating procedures, devices, and institutions which are currently developed and used manifest the constitutionalist concern for the legitimacy of international law, too.
So overall, both debates turn around international law's legitimacy − in the sense of an external standard of propriety and fairness −, all the while there is a broad range of views about the content of that standard, ranging from internal consistency and state equality (as most highlighted in the fragmentation debate) to democratic principles (as often analysed in the constitutionalization debate).
The most important contribution of both debates (global constitutionalism and the fragmentation discourse) is not to gloss over, deny, or de-politizise conflicts over values, principles, and priorities among international actors and participants in the global legal discourse, or to impose certain legal concepts in a hegemonic fashion. Instead, global constitutionalism (just as Benvenisti's and Down's contribution to the fragmentation debate) has exactly pinpointed the politics that are at stake. The lens of global constitutionalism, if conceived as a genuinely pluralist framework, allows to accept and re-assess fragmentation as a positive condition which manifests and facilitates the realization of the constitutional values of critique and contestation.
